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Is	the	liberal	international	order	in	a	state	of	terminal
decline?
The	disengagement	of	the	United	States	from	multilateral	cooperation	and	a	rise	in
‘illiberal’	politics	across	the	globe	have	led	many	observers	to	conclude	the	liberal
international	order	is	in	a	state	of	decline.	Drawing	on	a	new	study,	Mette	Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni	and	Stephanie	C.	Hofmann	argue	that	what	we	may	be	witnessing	is	not
necessarily	the	breakdown	of	the	existing	order,	but	rather	its	transformation	into	a
broader,	more	inclusive	system	of	global	governance,	reflecting	the	need	to
accommodate	new	actors	and	problems.
The	“liberal”	global	order	may	be	in	need	of	therapy.	After	all,	some	say	it	is	in	rapid	demise.
Others	insist	it	remains	as	strong	as	ever.	Not	only	is	the	vigour	of	the	liberal	order	hotly
debated,	but	its	very	constitution	is	questioned.	Is	the	order	about	economic	and/or	political	freedoms?	Is	it
a	global	order	or	merely	a	club	of	western	(or	westernised)	democracies	who	diffuse	and/or	impose	their	standards
on	others?	Lastly,	one	might	wonder	whether	the	liberal	order	presents	a	self-sustaining	normative	system,
or	whether	it	is	part	of	a	larger	system	in	which	principles	like	sovereignty	co-exist	with	liberalism.	These	questions
and	doubts	are	a	recipe	for	an	identity	crisis.
In	a	recent	study,	we	critically	examined	the	global	order	since	1945,	identifying	three	foundational	elements	that
have	done	most	of	the	‘ordering’	of	international	relations:	national	sovereignty,	economic	openness	and	rule-
based	multilateralism.	These	values	and	norms	do	not	combine	to	form	a	harmonious	system,	but	exist	in	a	tense
relationship	as	they	can	combine	in	different	–	and	sometimes	clashing	–	ways.	For	example,	principles	of
multilateralism	and	economic	openness	have	frequently	clashed	with	norms	of	sovereignty,	and	vice
versa.	Thus,	economic	liberalism	has	never	been	absolute,	nor	has	respect	for	national	self-determination	been
consistent.	Still,	we	concur	that	if	one	or	more	of	these	principles	were	to	lose	their	prescriptive	force	and	be
systematically	violated,	this	would	constitute	a	crisis	of	the	existing	order.
What	is	in	crisis?
One	source	of	anxiety	about	the	state	of	the	liberal	order	is	the	United	States’	disengagement
from	multilateral	cooperation,	and	pursuit	of	unilateral	policies.	Such	anxieties	take	for	granted	the	centrality	of
American	power	and	leadership	to	effective	multilateral	cooperation.	However,	U.S.	leadership	has	arguably	never
been	as	critical	to	the	functioning	of	existing	multilateral	frameworks	as	this	view	assumes.	While	the	U.S.	took	the
lead	in	crafting	major	economic	pillars	of	the	post-war	order	(including	the	Bretton	Woods	institutions	and	the
GATT),	it	has	been	a	reluctant	sponsor	of	many	others.
For	example,	Washington	has	long	been	sceptical	of	intrusive	multilateral	arms	control	beyond	the	nuclear
realm,	and	has	declined	to	sponsor	multilateral	cooperation	to	uphold	“liberal”	values	in	regard	to	the	displacement
of	people	and	freedom	of	movement.	When	it	comes	to	cooperation	on	environmental	protection,	sustainable
development	and	human	rights,	global	leadership	has	often	rested	with	countries	other	than	the	U.S.	In
short,	U.S.	involvement	in	the	global	institutional	infrastructure	has	been	fractional	and	conditional	for	many
decades,	suggesting	that	multilateralism,	sovereignty	and	economic	liberalism	can	be	upheld	without	U.S.
sponsorship.
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Others	worry	about	a	broader	“crisis	of	multilateralism”,	citing	unilateral	withdrawals	from	multilateral	fora,	growing
deadlock	in	major	international	institutions	such	as	the	UNSC	or	WTO,	and	a	general	lack	of	compliance	with
existing	international	rule-sets.	Here	again,	there	are	grounds	for	scepticism.	Recent	assessments
of	international	treaty	withdrawal	suggest	that	exit	from	international	agreements
is	neither	a	new	phenomenon,	nor	definitely	increasing.	While	a	few	high-profile	cases	of	exit	have	attracted	much
attention,	a	slight	increase	in	the	overall	number	of	treaty	withdrawals	must	be	seen	in	light	of	rapidly	growing
numbers	of	treaties	as	well	as	states	in	the	international	system,	a	point	we	will	come	back	to	later.
Second,	we	must	be	careful	not	to	conflate	the	fact	that	specific	international	organisations	are	challenged	by	exit
or	deadlock	with	the	institutional	order	itself	being	in	crisis.	Since	1945,	existing	international	organisations	have
continuously	been	abandoned	or	dissolved	while	new	ones	have	been	created	to	replace	them.	Third,	while	some
cases	of	exit	or	non-compliance	may	signal	disregard	for	multilateralism	as	such,	it	is	important	to	note	that	states
historically	have	often	used	exit	as	a	means	of	contestation	and	a	way	to	build	pressure
for	reforming	existing	international	agreements.	Indeed,	the	ability	to	contest	individual	international	institutions	and
push	for	their	adaptation	through	(threats	of)	exit	provides	an	important	means	of	securing	their	continued
legitimacy.
A	third	concern	recognises	that	multilateral	cooperation	is	on	the	rise	in	many	areas,	but	holds	that	institutional
proliferation	has	led	to	the	fragmentation	of	international	law,	and	entrenched	regionalism.	Thus,	some	worry	that
the	previously	“inclusive”	multilateral	system	is	giving	way	to	a	fragmentated	system	of	competing	regional	blocks
and	separate	“spheres	of	influence”.	Others	have	argued	that	institutional	fragmentation	threatens	multilateralism	by
encouraging	forum	shopping.	Again,	such	worries	often	lack	systematic	support.
Recent	analyses	of	membership	patterns	find	that	fragmentation	in	the	global	network	of	international
organisations	has	decreased	in	recent	years.	First,	although	distinct	regional	international	organisation	clusters
exist,	the	boundaries	between	these	clusters	are	becoming	less	sharp	as	states	are	increasingly	working	through
international	organisations	with	states	outside	their	own	clusters.	Second,	studies	have	shown	that	competitive	and
cooperative	inter-organisational	relations	can	coexist	and	improve	organisational
performance.	Third,	whereas	some	cases	of	institutional	proliferation	may	lead	to	fragmentation	and	conflict,	in
other	cases	the	creation	of	new	(regional)	institutions	alongside	long-standing	global	organisations	offers	an
additional	means	of	arbitrating	conflicting	interests,	and	facilitating	the	integration	of	more	states	into	the	global
order	on	an	equal	footing.
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A	fourth	alleged	sign	of	crisis	is	that	liberalism	as	such	is	in	decline,	as	illustrated	by	the	rise	of	illiberal	populist
forces	in	many	countries	across	the	globe.	When	considering	the	force	of	this	argument,	it	is	important	to	consider
whether	political	liberalism	has	ever	been	constitutive	of	the	post-war	global	order.	To	our	mind,	the	global	order	is
liberal	insofar	as	it	promotes	economic	openness	and	interdependence	between	most	countries	worldwide,	and	to
the	extent	that	it	is	in	principle	open	to	participation	by	most	states.	However,	we	do	not	see	the	order	as
embodying	a	firm	doctrine	of	political	liberalism	based	on	the	promotion	of	human	rights,	democracy,	or	free
movement	of	people.	After	all,	the	meaning	and	importance	of	these	terms	remain	heavily	contested	and	many
participants	in	the	construction	of	the	global	order	since	1945	have	been	non-democracies.	We	also	note	that
efforts	to	promote	political	liberalism	have	often	clashed	with	norms	of	sovereign	equality	–	a	foundational	aspect	of
the	current	global	order.
Profound	identity	crisis	or	coming	of	age?
The	contemporary	global	order	is	changing.	This	is	‘natural’.	Today’s	world	is	politically,	economically	and
technologically	more	complex	than	when	the	institutional	pillars	of	the	order	were	agreed	in	the	1940s	and	1950s.
This	has	led	to	contestation,	and	change.	On	balance,	however,	what	we	may	be	witnessing	is	not	necessarily	the
breakdown	of	the	existing	order,	but	rather	its	transformation	into	a	broader,	more	inclusive	system	of	global
governance,	reflecting	the	need	to	accommodate	new	actors	(some	of	which	are	more	reactionary	and
authoritarian)	and	problems.	The	system	is	‘growing	up’.	The	dispersion	of	material	power	in	the	international
system,	cited	by	many	as	a	critical	challenge,	has	been	associated	with	greater	heterogeneity	of	preferences	and
resulting	disputes.	However,	it	has	also	led	to	growing	participation	in	core	international	institutions,	and	to
the	proliferation	of	new	institutions	through	which	diverging	preferences	can	be	arbitrated.
Over	the	past	few	decades,	a	range	of	new	governance	fora	have	emerged	in	the	form	of	regional	organisations,
new	international	organisations,	and	transnational	public-private	partnerships.	This,	we	suggest,	may	signal	a
transition	from	an	international	order	constructed	around	a	few	commanding	international	organisations	dominated
by	powerful	western	states,	to	a	more	multifaceted	world	order	based	on	complex	and	polycentric	governance
arrangements	among	a	wider	community	of	national	governments,	international	organisations	and	non-state	actors.
While	this	growing	complexity	presents	significant	challenges	of	coordination,	as	of	now,	it	does	not
fundamentally	undermine	foundational	principles	of	sovereign	equality,	economic	openness,	and	rule-based
multilateral	interactions	as	such.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	article	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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